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SECURITIES LAW
GOING PRIVATE WITHOUT A BUSINESS PURPOSE-A RULE 10b-5
VIOLATION
Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and rule
10b-5,2 promulgated thereunder, were designed to prevent fraudu-
lent practices in the securities industry.3 In light of the emphasis on
disclosure which permeates the Act,4 it has been generally accepted
that to state a cause of action under these provisions it is necessary
to allege a disclosure violation.' Unfortunately, this requirement has
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2 Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceipt upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). See generally A. BROMBERG,
SECURIiEs LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 (1973); A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1OB-5 (rev.
ed. 1976).
1 Numerous provisions within the Act impose heavy burdens of disclosure upon the
corporation, persons controlling the corporation, and various participants in the securities
industry. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970), as amended
by 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (1976) (periodic filings); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15
U.S.C. § 78n (1970) (proxy rules); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q
(1970), as amended by 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q (1976) (exchange reports).
5 See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (dicta);
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 471 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1973); Popkin v. Bishop,
464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, 88 H~av. L. REv. 297, 301 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney];
Fleischer, Federal Regulation of Internal Corporate Affairs, 29 Bus. LAW. 179, 182 (1974
special issue). The emphasis on nondisclosure or misrepresentation in rule 10b-5 cases is due,
in part, to the common understanding of the term 'fraud." Fraud is generally viewed as
involving the "intent to deceive, or the making of a statement without a belief in, or with
reckless indifference towards, its truth." Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the
Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 1Ob-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1386
(1965). Thus, as one court has noted, "[tihe gravamen of a 10b-5 cause of action is decep-
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posed an impenetrable bar to federal relief for minority shareholders
whose investment interests in a corporation are extinguished by the
majority shareholders' execution of a going private plan," so long as
full disclosure is made of the means and goals of the transaction.7
tion." Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir. 1971). It has been recog-
nized, however, that fraud can take many forms. As was noted by the Second Circuit in A.T.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d. Cir. 1967):
[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden
type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical
methods should not provide immunity from the securities laws.
Id. at 397 (emphasis in original); accord, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), discussed in Patrick, Rule 10b-5, Equitable
Fraud and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: Another Step in the Continuing Development of Fed-
eral Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457 (1969).
1 Going private has been defined as the elimination of "public stock ownership in a
corporation with the intention of continuing the corporation's life and business as a closely
held company." Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33
(1975). There has been a plethora of discussion concerning state and federal remedies avail-
able for the protection of minority shareholders of a corporation which has decided to go
private. See, e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
987 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Borden]; Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L.
REV. 1019 (1975); Sommer, "Going Private:" A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,010; Note, Going Private: An Analysis
of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FORDHAm L. REV. 796 (1976); Note, Going Private: Who
Shall Provide the Remedies?, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 131 (1976); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE
L.J. 903 (1975). See generally Brudney, supra note 5; Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Share-
holders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969).
Going private can be effected through a variety of means. Among the more common of
these techniques is the "one-step acquisition" in which the company going private is merged
into another corporation that already owns a large percentage of the outstanding stock of the
company. The minority shareholders are then forced to accept cash for their shares in the
company going private. See, e.g., Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 909-10 (1975).
Another common means of going private involves a "two-step acquisition." This method
entails an initial tender offer to public shareholders followed by a merger. See, e.g., Borden,
supra, at 988; Brudney, supra note 5, at 330-31. Reverse stock splits may also be employed
to eliminate the public interest. See, e.g., Borden, supra, at 988; Note, Going Private: An
Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 796, 798-99 (1976).
' In Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d
283 (2d Cir. 1975), the court observed:
While [§] 10(b) . . .must be read flexibly, and not technically or restrictively,
. ..there is nothing invalid per se in a corporate effort to free itself from federal
regulations, provided the means and the methods used to effectuate that objective
are allowable under the law. Nor has the federal securities law placed profit-making
or shrewd business tactics designed to benefit insiders, without more, beyond the
pale. Those laws . .. are satisfied if a full and fair disclosure is made . ...
386 F. Supp. at 17. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972); Lessler v.
Dominion Textile Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Greenberg v. Institutional Investor
Sys., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Tanzer Economic Assocs. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dreier v. Music
Makers Group, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,406
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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Several recent decisions in the Second Circuit, however, mark a
significant departure from this restrictive interpretation.8 Perhaps
the most notable of these decisions is Marshel v. AFW Fabric
Corp.,' in which the Second Circuit recognized that a federal cause
of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 may exist absent a
disclosure violation where controlling shareholders seek to squeeze
out minority interests by means of a merger not justified by any
valid corporate purpose.'0
The Marshel court was presented with a challenge to a going
private plan typical of those used in recent years." Until 1968, Con-
cord Fabrics was a closely held corporation completely owned by
members of the Weinstein family. Encouraged by the bull market
of the late sixties, Concord "went public" with an initial offering of
300,000 shares of common stock at $15 per share. A year later, indi-
vidual Weinstein family members offered and sold to the public an
additional 200,000 shares at $20 per share. Despite these sales, the
Weinsteins retained sixty-eight percent of Concord's outstanding
stock.'2
In the depressed economic climate of the early seventies, Con-
cord's stock declined in value, reaching a low of $1 per share in 1974.
Deciding to regain complete ownership of Concord, the Weinsteins
organized AFW and transferred to it their Concord shares, receiving
in return 100 percent of AFW's stock. They planned to merge Con-
cord into AFW'3 and cancel the publicly owned shares of Concord
stock. Each public shareholder was to receive $3 per share, at a cost
of over $1.6 million to the corporate treasury." Shareholder approval
of the merger was certain since the Weinsteins themselves con-
See Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for determination
of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976), reo'g 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Merrit v. Libby,
McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753), rev'g 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
9 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), remanded for determination of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228 (1976),
rev'g 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
533 F.2d at 1282.
See Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975) (discussion of the particulars of
various going private plans); note 6 supra.
12 533 F.2d at 1278-79.
" Originally, the Weinsteins hoped to accomplish their objective through a two-step
merger: First, a tender offer was to be made by AFW to Concord public shareholders; and
second, AFW was to execute the merger. The tender offer plan was abandoned, however, when
two public shareholders instituted actions seeking to enjoin the offer, and a one-step plan was
adopted. Id. at 1279; see note 6 supra.
24 533 F.2d at 1279-80. This expenditure was to be financed through a bank loan to AFW
which Concord would ultimately assume. Id. at 1279.
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trolled more than two-thirds of the shares required by the applicable
state long-form merger statute."5 Those shareholders dissatisfied
with the $3 per share valuation would be left with only the right to
seek an appraisal pursuant to New York law."6
The proxy material accompanying the merger proposal clearly
disclosed that the only objective of the merger was the return of the
corporation to private ownership for the sole benefit of the Wein-
steins. 7 Faced with these facts, the district court denied motions by
public shareholders for a preliminary injunction to restrain the
merger.18 The court held that since there had been full disclosure,
there had been no violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.11 In
"5 See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 903 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
18 See id. §§ 623, 910. The appraisal remedy is rarely satisfactory since the proceedings
are lengthy, often taking as long as a year, the stockholder risks the assessment of costs
against him, and rarely does it result in a substantial difference in valuation. See generally
Brudney, supra note 5, at 304-07; Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Ap-
praisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1931).
'7 The proxy statement declared:
"The purpose of the proposed merger of AFW into the Company [Concord] is to
return the Company to the status of a privately-held corporation owned by the
Weinstein family. Upon consummation of the merger, the Weinsteins will be the
sole stockholders and directors of the Company, and will thus be able to determine
all policies of the Company, such as salaries for themselves and others, dividends
and business activities, without public scrutiny and solely with regard to their own
interests."
533 F.2d at 1279. It is difficult to imagine a more telling indication of the defendant's intent
and purpose. The proxy material also stated:
"The effect of the proposed merger will also be that without any additional invest-
ment on the part of the Weinstein family their interest in the stockholders' equity
of the Company will be increased from approximately $9,494,000 (representing 68%
of equity as of February 2, 1975) to approximately $12,285,000 (representing 100%
of such equity on a pro forma basis"... ....
Id. at 1280 n.4.
11 398 F. Supp. at 739. Injunctive relief was obtained, however, in a state court proceed-
ing. Pursuant to the authority granted the attorney general by the New York blue sky law
antifraud provision, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 353 (McKinney 1963), the attorney general
brought an action to enjoin the merger. The New York court granted the relief, finding "the
fact that full disclosure of the aims of the Weinstein group have been articulated," oversha-
dowed by the state policy of ensuring that "the small investor will not be prey to a self-
interested majority either in going public or private." People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83
Misc. 2d 120, 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 554 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787,
357 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1975).
1, 398 F. Supp. at 739. Judge MacMahon concluded that "rule 10b-5 simply does not
encompass these alleged wrongs." Id. at 738. Support for the district court's conclusion can
be culled from a number of previous nondisclosure cases in the Southern District of New York.
See, e.g., Tanzer Economic Assocs. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kaufmann
v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975);
Dreier v. Music Makers Group, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Greenberg v. Institutional Investor Sys., Inc., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lessler v. Dominion
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reaching its decision, the district court relied on the Second Cir-
cuit's earlier language in Popkin v. Bishop,"0 wherein the court had
noted that nondisclosure is a key issue in rule 10b-5 cases .2 The
Popkin court had concluded that "if federal law ensures that share-
holder approval is fairly sought and freely given, the principal fed-
eral interest is at an end."
On appeal, the Marshel court rejected the narrow and restric-
tive interpretation of the requisites of a rule 10b-5 cause of action
adhered to by the district court. Rather than limiting application
of the rule to situations involving nondisclosure or misrepresen-
tation, the court held that in a going private case, where the transac-
tion itself constitutes a fraud, a cause of action under 10b-5 may
exist despite disclosure of all relevant facts.23 Looking at the sub-
stance rather than the form of the challenged transaction, the Sec-
ond Circuit found it to be a clear violation of rule 10b-5.
The Marshel court undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that
the Weinsteins had reaped considerable benefits through their deci-
sion to go public in 1968, and now hoped to gain additional personal
pecuniary benefits by going private.24 The court viewed the merger
as an attempt by the Weinsteins to squeeze out the minority share-
holders at a price determined by the Weinsteins and at a cost to be
borne by the corporate treasury, 5 in circumstances such that the
minority was without the ability to effectively object.2 18 Such con-
duct, the court declared, amounted to a breach of the fiduciary duty
owed by the Weinsteins, as controlling shareholders, to the corpora-
Textile Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Cf. Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), and Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
wherein the courts recognized that a 10b-5 cause of action can exist in a going private
transaction where a disclosure violation has occurred.
11 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
21 Id. at 719.
21 Id. at 720.
1 533 F.2d at 1282.
24 See note 17 supra.
See 533 F.2d at 1280.
26 The Second Circuit stated:
Under these circumstances it would surely be anomalous to hold that a cause of
action is stated under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the fraudulent conduct in
connection with a purchase or sale of securities includes deception but that simi-
larly fraudulent practices carried out with prior disclosure to the helpless victim
do not give rise to a Rule 10b-5 claim.
Id. at 1282. In Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978; 986 (6th Cir. 1976), petition for cert.
filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5), the Sixth Circuit emphasized the
"helpless victim" aspect of Marshel, declaring that the Marsh plaintiffs "were not 'helpless
victims' because they . . . had an opportunity to sell their shares at a premium." 533 F.2d
at 986.
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tion and the minority shareholders." Characterizing the merger
plan as "an attempt by the majority stockholders to utilize corpo-
rate funds for strictly personal benefit,"" the Second Circuit de-
clared that although mere allegations of corporate mismanagement
and self-dealing do not support a claim under the federal securities
laws, such a claim does exist where this conduct is part of a fraudu-
lent scheme involving the purchase and sale of securities,29 even if
there has been full disclosure. 0
In reversing the district court's decision, the Marshel court was
forced to reconcile the apparent conflict between its decision and
the Second Circuit's earlier holding in Popkin.3 1 In Popkin, a minor-
ity shareholder sought to enjoin a proposed merger on the grounds
that the proposed exchange ratios were unfair, and that the propo-
nents of the plan had breached their fiduciary obligations to the
corporation and the minority shareholders.3 2 The Popkin court held
that since there had been full disclosure, there existed no basis for
federal injunctive relief.33 Noting that in Popkin it was merely the
fairness of the exchange ratios and not the merger itself that was
challenged, 34 the Marshel court declared Popkin to be
"inapposite. '35 While the Marshel plaintiffs, like those in Popkin,
21 533 F.2d at 1282. The principle that the majority owes a fiduciary duty to the minority
is well established: "When a number of stockholders combine to constitute themselves a
majority in order to control the corporation as they see fit, they become for all practical
purposes the corporation itself, and assume the trust relation occupied by the corporation
towards its stockholders." Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 F. 625, 631
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 11-12 (1971); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125
F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 (1942). It is also well established that the
corporation itself can be injured by the majority's breach of its fiduciary duties. See, e.g.,
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).
21 533 F.2d at 1282.
19 A merger involving an exchange of securities constitutes a purchase and sale within
the meaning of rule 10b-5. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho
v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Vine
v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). See A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 4.7 (1973).
0 533 F.2d at 1282.
31 See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
11 464 F.2d at 716.
Id. at 718-20.
1' 533 F.2d at 1282. In Popkin, the merger itself was beyond attack since its execution
was required by the terms of a stipulation of settlement filed in an earlier suit. 464 F.2d at
716.
3 533 F.2d at 1282. Judge Smith, in his concurring opinion in Marshel, disagreed with
this conclusion. He found it "difficult to reconcile the 10(b) basis of the holding with the
opinion in Popkin v. Bishop. " Id. (Smith, J., concurring) (citation omitted). He felt, however,
that injunctive relief was "sustainable on the ground of breach of the fiduciary duty under
[Vol. 51:417
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had complained of the inadequate compensation offered them for
their shares, the Marshel plaintiffs focused their complaint on the
merger itself as the act of actionable fraud. 6 Emphasizing the de-
fendants' concession in Marshel that the merger was supported by
no justifiable business purpose and was designed strictly for the
Weinsteins' personal benefit,37 the court found that the Marshel
plaintiffs, unlike those in Popkin, had stated a valid cause of ac-
tion.31
The emphasis in Marshel on the lack of a business purpose
rather than on a disclosure violation as a determinative factor in
recognizing a rule 10b-5 violation in a going private transaction was
further elucidated by the Second Circuit in Merrit v. Libby,
McNeill & Libby.39 In Merrit, unlike Marshel, there was no clear
substantiation of the allegation that the merger itself was fraudu-
lent. The acquiring corporation was not a sham entity created solely
for the purpose of effectuating the merger as was AFW.4 ° Prior to the
adoption of the going private plan, the parent of the acquiring cor-
poration had gradually obtained majority control of the target cor-
poration through a variety of means." The merger plan itself en-
tailed a further investment of fresh capital on the part of the acquir-
ing corporation." Thus, the merger was not to be effected through
New York law of the majority shareholders in their admitted self-dealing." Id.
-1 See id. This distinction between an allegation of a merger brought about by fraud and
an allegation of fraudulent merger terms was recently applied by the Sixth Circuit in Marsh
v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S.
July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5). Marsh involved a tender offer which disclosed that, if successful,
the offeror would eliminate the dividends paid by the target corporation, thus reducing the
cost of an eventual merger between them. A complaint filed by minority stockholders alleged
that the plan to omit the dividend was for an improper purpose and was fraudulent per se,
but did not attack the prospective merger itself. Disallowing the claim in the absence of a
disclosure violation, the court declared:
[W]e decline to equate a breach of fiduciary duty with fraud. . . . [A] breach of
fiduciary duty in formulating the terms of a merger does not itself raise a Rule 10b-
5 claim; to hold otherwise is to provide a federal forum for all shareholders dissatis-
fied with the terms of a proposed merger, which is not the intent of § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.
533 F.2d at 984.
533 F.2d at 1282. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
533 F.2d at 1282.
533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1312.
" Control of the target corporation was acquired in part through purchases on the open
market, and in part by a standby arrangement to pick up surplus shares on a subscription
offer made by the target corporation to its shareholders. This investment totalled about $66
million. Id.
42 The acquiring corporation offered the minority stockholders $8.125 per share under
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a raid on the corporate treasury of the target for the personal advan-
tage of a few.
More importantly, in Merrit the Second Circuit determined
that there did appear to be valid corporate purposes for the merger,
motives that would benefit not only the acquiring corporation and
its parent, but also the target corporation. 3 Thus, although elimina-
tion of public shareholders was clearly an objective of the merger,
it apparently was not the sole motivation for the scheme. In view of
all this, the Second Circuit denied a preliminary injunction." Sig-
nificantly, however, the Merrit court refused to dismiss as frivolous
the plaintiff's contention that the merger constituted a violation of
rule 10b-5.1 The court observed that if in fact the intention to freeze
out the public was the dominant motivation for the merger, a cause
of action under 10b-5 might lie.4"
In adopting the view that, regardless of full disclosure, a cause
of action may exist under rule 10b-5 where a merger serving no
corporate purpose is employed as a method of going private, the
Second Circuit appears to have moved dramatically away from the
implications of its earlier decision in Popkin.47 In so doing, the Sec-
ond Circuit does not stand alone: a number of district courts"5 and
both the terms of the tender offer and the terms of the merger. To satisfy this offer, the
acquiring corporation had to invest an additional $34 million. Id.
13 Id. The acquiring corporation's motives were revealed in a confidential memorandum
obtained through discovery. The acquiring corporation hoped to take advantage of the tar-
get's business contacts in expanding its markets, and was also attracted by the target corpora-
tion's healthy balance sheet. Less clear, however, are the benefits which the Merrit court
foresaw accruing to the target corporation. The memorandum did refer to the financial bene-
fits which would result from elimination of the minority shareholders. It indicated that by
eliminating the minority, the allocation of development programs would be simplified and
the collection of royalties would be expedited. Going private would also permit structural
modifications which might otherwise involve a breach of duty towards the minority. Projected
savings were estimated at about $4.3 million annually. Id. It would seem, however, that these
benefits would exist in almost every squeezeout merger. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile
the Merrit court's position with the apparent rejection by the Marshel court of similar benefits
as the basis of a valid corporate purpose for merger. See note 61 infra.
" Given the facts in Merrit, the court found neither probability of success on the merits
nor the possibility of irreparable injury. Consequently, the injunction was denied. 533 F.2d
at 1313.
45 Id.
4' Id.
4 See cases cited note 19 supra.
' See, e.g., Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974), discussed in Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger:
Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699 (1975). It should be noted that several state courts have
held that a merger must be supported by a valid business purpose. See, e.g., Paine v. Sauls-
bury, 200 Mich. 58, 65-66, 166 N.W. 1036, 1038-39 (1918); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash.
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several commentators" have adopted a similar position. Moreover,
the implementation of a business purpose test also reflects the ap-
parent position of the Securities and Exchange Commission as indi-
cated by its proposed rules embodying such a standard." Unfortu-
nately, although the result reached in Marshel may be laudatory,1
the language employed by the court52 is susceptible to the interpre-
tation that a merger without a justifiable corporate purpose is in
itself a breach of fiduciary duty actionable under rule 10b-5. Indeed,
in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,53 the Second Circuit construed
Marshel as standing for just such a proposition.
The Green court was presented with a challenge to a merger
planned under the Delaware short-form merger statute, whereby the
owners of more than ninety percent of the outstanding shares can
effectuate the merger without shareholder vote or notice. In Green,
ninety-five percent of the capital stock of the target corporation was
owned by a wholly owned subsidiary of Santa Fe Industries, Inc. In
order to return the target corporation to private ownership, a fourth
2d 286, 301, 242 P.2d 1025, 1034-35 (1952). But see Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J.
Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975), where the court expressly discounted the absence of a business
purpose in assessing the legality of a proposed going private merger.
11 See, e.g., Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG.
L.J. 33 (1975); Sommer, "Going Private:" A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010; Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissent-
ing Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 IIv. L. REv. 1189, 1204 (1964). This view, however,
has not been unanimously accepted. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 6, at 1022-23.
Proposed Rules 13e-3A, 13e-3B, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,231 (Feb. 6, 1975),
as appearing in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 23,704-05.
5, By recognizing that in going private situations, fraud does not necessarily take the
guise of nondisclosure or misrepresentation, the Marshel decision utilizes the often overlooked
provisions of rule 10b-5 that are aimed at acts and devices that operate as a fraud. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (1976), quoted in note 2 supra. It should be emphasized, however,
that Marshel involved unusual facts that clearly indicated improper conduct and patent self-
dealing. Such elements as the proximity in time between going public and going private, the
substantial gains to be reaped by the creation of a shell corporation through which the merger
scheme might be effected, the concentration of the majority interest in the hands of one
family, and the helplessness of the public shareholders to forestall the plan clearly suggest
the fraudulent practices which rule 10b-5 was designed to prevent. Given these facts, it is
not surprising that the Second Circuit refused to apply the technical and ill-founded rule
requiring nondisclosure or misrepresentation as a prerequisite to the granting of relief under
rule 10b-5 in the going private situation.
52 The Marshel court stated:
The controlling shareholders of Concord have devised a scheme to defraud their
corporation and the minority shareholders to whom they owe fiduciary obligations
by causing Concord to finance the liquidation of the minority's interest with no
justification in the form of a valid corporate purpose.
533 F.2d at 1282 (emphasis added).
533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 54 (1976) (No. 75-1753), rev'g 391 F.
Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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corporation was organized to which this capital stock was trans-
ferred in exchange for the new corporation's capital stock. The plan
of merger called for the new corporation to be merged into the target
corporation, with the latter surviving. The shares were valued by an
independent party on the basis of a thorough study of the target
company's financial situation.14 Thus, the facts in Green, unlike
those in Marshel, did not suggest clearly fraudulent activities or
patent self-dealing for the benefit of particular individuals.
Failing to discuss these distinctions, the Second Circuit held in
Green that where the majority shareholders validly execute a Dela-
ware short-form merger,"5 the majority commits a breach of its fidu-
ciary duty to the minority if the merger lacks a justifiable business
purpose. In holding that such conduct is actionable under rule
10b-5, the Second Circuit adopted a broad rule56 based on the am-
biguous language employed in Marshel.7 The Green rule, however,
creates several problems not raised by Marshel. While extending
extraordinary protection to minority shareholders, it ignores the
existence of the majority's interest in the corporation" and over-
looks the fact that one of the risks assumed by every purchaser of
a corporation's stock is that his investment may be extinguished
through events beyond his control.59 It also encroaches upon state
corporate law by implicitly adding to state merger statutes the
533 F.2d at 1287-89.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1974).
The court stated:
We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule lOb-5 when it charges, in
connection with a Delaware short-form merger, that the majority has committed a
breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting
the merger without any justifiable business purpose.
533 F.2d at 1291.
1, See note 52 supra.
I The power of the majority shareholders to control the corporation is a basic principle
of corporate law. In Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 F. 625 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886),
the court observed:
It cannot be denied that minority stockholders are bound hand and foot. to the
majority in all matters of legitimate administration of the corporate affairs; and the
courts are powerless to redress many forms of oppression practiced upon the minor-
ity under the guise of legal sanction, which fall short of actual fraud. This is a
consequence of the implied contract of association, by which it is agreed, in ad-
vance, that a majority shall bind the whole body as to all transactions within the
scope of the corporate powers.
Id. at 630-31. Accord, Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per
curiam, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 338
N.E.2d 614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975).
11 See, e.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 338 N.E.2d 614, 376
N.Y.S.2d 103 (1975).
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requirement of a valid business purpose." Moreover, it does so
without clearly delineating the parameters of this business purpose
criterion. The Green court did not indicate which corporation, ac-
quiring, acquired, or both, must have the business purpose. Nor
is the court instructive concerning what constitutes a valid corpo-
rate purpose sufficient to remove the merger from the reach of rule
10b-5.1'
In light of these difficulties, it is submitted that the Green rule
is an unnecessary and unfortunate extension of Marshel. Perhaps,
the Green bench read the Marshel holding too simplistically,12 and
thus stretched the court's language beyond the meaning it was origi-
nally intended to convey. 3 Standing alone, Marshel holds simply
that judicial inquiry into the legality of a going private merger under
10b-5 need not be foreclosed upon a finding that full disclosure has
been made. By discarding the rule that nondisclosure is an essential
prerequisite to a rule 10b-5 action, the Marshel holding permits a
proper and flexible examination of the going private transaction
1 The effect of Green and Marshel on state law is illustrated by the recent opinion of a
New York court in Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1976). There, the court noted that until recently appraisal rights was the
exclusive remedy for dissenting shareholders under New York law. Id. at 295, 380 N.Y.S.2d
at 960. But, considering the Marshel and Green decisions, the court concluded that a new
rule had emerged. The Schulwolf court stated that
there is no violation of the fiduciary duty owed by the dominant stockholders to
the public stockholders if there is a proper corporate purpose for the merger and
there has been neither fraud, self-dealing nor price manipulation and the alterna-
tives afforded to the public shareholders are a fair price fairly determined or the
statutory right to an appraisal.
Id. at 297, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
11 Marshel and Green would appear to indicate that relief from the reporting require-
ments of the SEC and the stock exchanges is an insufficient justification for going private.
In Merrit, however, the Second Circuit seemed to suggest that a decrease in the cost of
operating a business might constitute a valid corporate purpose. 533 F.2d at 1313.
One commentator has suggested that in the case of a parent corporation trying to elimi-
nate public holdings in a subsidiary with which it has significant dealings, such an objective
may in fact constitute a valid corporate purpose. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1189, 1198 (1964). Another commentator has
stated that the realization of corporate profit alone will normally be insufficient. Note, Going
Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 922-23 (1975). That author suggests that the valid corporate pur-
pose standard in the going private situation should require "a compelling corporate need to
revert to a privately held status in order to function as a viable business entity." Id. at 931.
62 The discussion of Marshel by the Green court is rather limited. See 533 F.2d at 1291.
The exact language of the Marshel court is as follows:
We hold that when controlling stockholders and directors of a publicly-held corpo-
ration cause it to expend corporate funds to force elimination of minority stockhold-
ers' equity participation for reasons not benefiting the corporation but rather serv-
ing only the interests of the controlling stockholders such conduct will be enjoined
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ....
533 F.2d at 1281.
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attacked as fraudulent-an examination which includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, the question of whether there exists a valid
corporate purpose. So interpreted, the Marshel decision opens the
way to a positive attack on the abuses rule 10b-5 was intended to
prevent, without mandating the extreme position adopted by the
Green court.
Th6rkse M. Haberle
SHARES IN PRIVATE COOPERATIVE APARTMENT HELD NOT TO
BE SECURITIES
Grenader v. Spitz
The Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 represent the principal congressional attempts to curb serious
abuses in a previously unregulated financial market. In defining the
term "security" as used within the Acts,4 Congress included not only
the more commonly known instruments traded for speculation or
investment, such as stocks and bonds, but also instruments such as
"investment contracts,"'5 which are capable of lending themselves
to a more flexible interpretation.' In light of these rather adaptable
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-77 (1934). Essentially, the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency listed the extensive use of credit in the markets, the manipula-
tion of prices, short-swing trading by insiders, and inadequate financial disclosure by listed
corporations as the major abuses sought to be remedied. Id. See Loomis, The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214,
216-17 (1959). See also Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government
View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 6, 9 (1959).
The definition of a "security" appears in the Securities Act as follows:
[Ulnless the context otherwise requires-(1) The term "security" means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security" .. ..
Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). The definition of a security in the Exchange
Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970), is practically identical to that contained in the
Securities Act. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
See note 4 supra.
' In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether offerings of small parcels of orchard land, coupled with service contracts
